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RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES - FICTITIOUS PAYEE - CONSTRUCTION OF §9(3) OF THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.- Appellant, doing business as Mike's Bar,
cashed 42 checks for one Berke who, in his capacity as bookkeeper for the
Farmer's Union, fraudulently requisitioned them for the payment of claims to
fictitious payees. The checks were made out by the cashier, signed by the
proper officer, and returned to Berke for delivery. Appellant required no
security of Berke and did not investigate his right to the checks. The checks
were deposited by appellant and, in the regular channel of business, subse-
quently charged to the account of the Farmer's Union. The fraud was dis-
covered in the course of an official audit of the company's books some months
later and appellee, who insured the company against fraud, paid the loss and
brought this action to recover from appellant. The lower court directed a
verdict against appellant. On appeal it was held that § 9(3) of the Negot-
iable Instruments Law was not applicable since there was no intent or
knowledge on the part of the maker of the checks that the payees furnished
by Berke were non-existent. The checks were therefore not "bearer" paper
and consequently appellant received no title by reason of the forged signa-
tures. New York Cas. Co. v. Sazenski, 60 N.W.2d. 368 (Minn. 1953).
§ 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: "The instrument
is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or
non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable." This provision extended the protection given bona fide purchasers
of negotiable instruments under the common law. The common law made it
mandatory for the person being charged on the instrument to have knowledge
of the fraud, whereas under the Negotiable Instruments Law, responsibility
for the fraud of the employee making the check is cast upon the employer.
2
This change would seem to indicate a necessity for changing laws to keep
abreast of changing world conditions. In adopting the provisions of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law the legislatures of the various states put their stamp
of approval on this progressive step.
At the time the wording of the Negotiable Instruments Law was chosen
by the Commission for Uniform Laws, progress indicated a change from the
common law and it was recognized by the draftsmen of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.3 Further progress has long indicated a change in the
section in question and this need has been recognized by the American Bank-
ers Association who recommended that the section be amended by adding:
"or known to his employee or other agent who supplies the name of such
payee."' Idaho led the way by adopting this amendment in 1931. 5 MontanaO
and Illinois, r too, have found this addition necessary. The draftsmen of the
Uniform Commercial Code were alert to the need for a change giving further
protection to innocent purchasers for value. Their amendment to this section
of the code would eliminate such a fraudulent instrument as bearer paper
1. Britton, Bills and Notes §148 (1943).
2. Negotiable Instruments Law §9 (3).
3. Ibid.
4. Britton, Bills and Notes §149 (1943).
5. Idaho Code Ann. §26-109 (3) (1932).
6. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §8416 (3) (1935).
7. Il1. Rev. Stat. c. 98, §29 (3) (1945).
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under all conditions, but would make effective all endorsements within the
apparently normal chain. 8
A primary purpose of statutory construction is to fulfill the legislative in-
tent and remedy the evil that prompted the legislatlon.' Although the narrow
construction of this section of the Negotiable Instruments Law handed down
in the instant case is unquestionably in agreement with the majority of cases
todaylo it does not fufill this purpose. There can be little doubt that the
intention of the legislature in adopting § 9(3) of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law was to enhance the negotiability of negotiable instruments by pro-
tecting innocent purchasers for value. In order to effectuate this intent the
court in the instant case should have discarded the doctrine of stare decisis in
favor of a broad construction. Under the present majority rule"I the statute
is rendered ineffectual, for the security systems used in the business world of
today seldom permit the maker of a negotiable document to designate the
payee or afford him an opportunity to negotiage the instrument.
The doctrine of stare decisis is without question a firm foundation for the
guidance of our courts, but precedent, like an automobile, does become out-
moded.
BAYARD LEWIS.
INFANTS - JUVENILE COURTS - JURISDICTIONS OVER OFFENSES ARISING
UNDER MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES- The petitioners, two minors, were sentenced
to confinement in the city jail after pleading guilty to disorderly conduct be-
fore a police magistrate. They applied to the District Court, sitting in its
capacity as a juvenile court, for writs of habeas corpus. These were granted
on the ground that the police magistrate lacked jurisdiction to .try the peti-
tioners without the consent of the juvenile court. Held, order affirmed. The
constitutional provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of muni-
cipal ordinances in the police magistrate did not authorize him to try minors
without the consent of the juvenile court. State ex rel City of Minot v.
Gronna, 59 N.W.2d 514 (N. D. 1953).
8. Uniform Commercial Code §3-405.
9. See, E. g., Houghton Miffin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat. B.E.T. Co., 293 Ill. App.
423, 12 N.E.2d 714, 716 (1938); Schoellkopf v. DeVry, 366'I11. 39, 7 N.E.2d 757,
759 (1937) "A primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative
intention."; People v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 360 Ill. 454, 196
N.E. 515, 517 (1935); People v. Hughes, 357 11. 524, 192 N.E. 551, 553 (1934)
(to find the intent of the legislature the courts will look at "the evil to be remedied and
the object to be attained").
10. E. g., Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, 185 AtI. 796, 798
(1936); American Sash and Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d
1034, 1040 (1933); See Swift and Company v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19
N.E. 992, 994 (1939).
11. Jorgenson Chevrolet Co. v. First National Bank, 217 Minn. 413, 14 N.W.2d 618,
621 (1944); City of St. Paul v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N.W. 516,
518 (1922) "Where by the fraud of a third person a depositor of a bank is induced to
draw a check payable to a non-existing person or order, the drawer ignorant of the tact
and intending no fraud, the bank is not authorized to pay . . . although it appears to
have been previously endorsed by the party named as payee."; 24 Minn. L. Rev. 988
(1940) (where an agent with fraudulent intent is not authorized to sign but merely
supplied the name of the payee, "the general rule is that his knowledge that the payee
is fictitious cannot be imputed to the principal.").
